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This paper aims to identify the determinants behind the dierent evolution of sovereign bond yields
in euro area countries for the period of the current crisis. Up to the time of the collapse of Lehman
Brothers, global risk premium was the main driver of spreads. Afterwards, the relevance of idiosyncratic
factors increased. Although liquidity premiums played a larger role in the months following September
2008, as the nancial crisis spilled over into a strongly deteriorating macroeconomic environment, the
importance of country credit risk factors increased. In the rst ve months of 2010, heterogeneity in
sovereign credit risk premiums and a further increase in global risk aversion were, to a large extent, the
determining factors behind the evolution of spreads.
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11 Introduction
The economic and nancial crisis that started in mid-2007 has had an unprecedented
impact on the euro area government bond market. Although diering from country to
country, sovereign yield spreads to German bonds have been much higher than in the
period preceding the start of the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union.
The widening of sovereign bond yield spreads took place against a background of
deteriorating public nances in several countries, as well as an increase in risk aversion
and a deterioration in liquidity conditions in international nancial markets. This suggests
the evolution of spreads to Germany reected both an increase in country credit risk and
liquidity premiums and, that the increase in such premiums is a result of the interaction
between common and idiosyncratic factors. The purpose of this study is to identify such
factors' contribution to the dierent evolution of government bond yields in euro area
countries in the current crisis.
The sample period is from early 2007 to May 2010. In order to ensure the robustness
of the results, we measured the spread determinants using a reasonably comprehensive set
of variables usually found in the literature. Sovereign credit risk was evaluated both on
macroeconomic and nancial market variables. In the case of liquidity, we have calculated
several indicators using trade and quotes data from the MTS platforms for the specic
bonds used in the construction of the yield spreads. We have also calculated several
indirect liquidity indicators related with the relative size of each country's sovereign bond
market and liquidity risk. Finally we have endeavoured to capture the co-movements in
spreads by variables generally used to proxy the risk premium in international nancial
markets.
According to the results, euro area sovereign spreads in the period under analysis
may be explained by the risk premium in international nancial markets, as well as by
idiosyncratic factors related with sovereign credit risk and the liquidity characteristics of
domestic government bond markets. There has been a change in the relative importance
of each of these factors in explaining the spreads since the beginning of 2007. This
situation resulted both from the evolution of spread determining factors and changes in
spreads' sensitivity to them. In the period prior to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, euro
2area sovereign spreads were mainly driven by the international risk premium. With the
deepening of the economic and nancial crisis, factors specic to each economy increased
in relevance. Initially, the increase in spreads was largely due to liquidity premiums.
However, as the nancial crisis spilled over into a strongly deteriorating macroeconomic
environment, there was an increase in the importance of country credit risk factors. In the
rst ve months of 2010, the heterogeneity of sovereign credit risk premiums and a further
increase in global risk aversion were major determining factors behind the evolution of
spreads.
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the euro area sovereign deter-
minants and reviews the literature; section 3 provides a descriptive analysis of the data
used; the econometric results are presented in section 4; and, nally, section 5 includes
the main conclusions.
2 Euro area sovereign bond yield spread determinants
In the euro area, given the single monetary policy and the relative integration of na-
tional bond markets, long term sovereign yield spreads mainly reect dierences related
to issuers' credit risk and the liquidity of securities. The economic literature has, accord-
ingly, attached particular importance to the breakdown of spreads between credit risk and
liquidity premiums.
The credit risk premium of a security corresponds to the compensation demanded by
investors to cover the risk of future cash ows being dierent from those agreed, due to
default. This premium depends on each issuer's idiosyncratic factors, which determine the
level of risk, as well as on the risk premium in the nancial markets. This risk premium, in
turn, is determined by the degree of investors' risk aversion and by the global uncertainty
prevailing in international nancial markets. Therefore, in terms of credit risk, sovereign
bond yield spreads should be related with each country's public nances sustainability
indicators and with risk indicators in international nancial markets. In times of lower
risk appetite, as in the current economic and nancial crisis, the global risk premium
tends to increase. This fact, per se, contributes to an increase in the yield spreads of
countries which the market assesses as having a higher default risk in comparison to lower
3risk countries. In situations of the deterioration of a country's default risk, the increase
in the global risk premium also amplies the impact of this deterioration on spreads.
Regarding liquidity, the return demanded by investors is expected to be lower for bonds
that can be traded quickly, at low cost and without major price changes. Dierences in
liquidity among national securities may reect several factors, such as the value of out-
standing amounts, the time elapsed since their issue, whether they are eligible for delivery
in the futures market, as well as the degree of eciency in primary and secondary markets
in which they are traded. The liquidity premium included in the price of each bond should
contain a component associated with the security's expected level of liquidity, and a com-
pensation for unanticipated changes in liquidity (liquidity risk). This last component
depend both on factors that specically aect the future liquidity of the security, as well
as on the global liquidity demand conditions prevailing in international markets. In times
of increased macroeconomic uncertainty and greater volatility in nancial markets, there
is a higher likelihood of the need to unwind an investment position quickly. This should
increase the demand for assets that can be traded at low cost. In these periods, higher
liquidity risk contributes to an increase in liquidity premiums, suggesting the existence of
a positive correlation between liquidity and credit risk premiums.
A breakdown of sovereign yield spreads into components determined by credit quality
and related to liquidity is not easy to perform empirically, as these characteristics are
not directly observable and are not completely independent. Additionally, the relative
importance of credit and liquidity risks tends to change over time in line with structural
changes in economies, as well as their cyclical position and, consequently, the risk premium
in international nancial markets.
Table 1 presents a summary of the empirical results for euro area sovereign bond yield
spreads organized by the sample period.
A robust nding in the literature is that euro area sovereign yield spreads are largely
determined by a common factor. This factor, which is interpreted as the global risk
appetite, is usually measured by credit risk premium indicators on corporate bonds and
uncertainty in international nancial markets. Empirical results also support the relevance
of governments' creditworthiness in determining the spreads. This conclusion is relatively
4independent from the variables used to measure country credit risk, namely variables
related with public nances, credit ratings or information from nancial markets, such as
Credit Default Swaps (CDS).1 In the case of liquidity, the evidence is mixed. Bernoth
et al. (2006) and Schuknecht et al. (2010) conclude that liquidity is not a signicant
determinant of sovereign yield spreads in euro area countries. Codogno et al. (2003) and
Sgherri and Zoli (2009) also indicate a very limited eect of liquidity. In turn, G omez-Puig
(2006), Beber et al. (2009), Schwartz (2009), Ejsing and Sihvonen (2009), Attinasi et al.
(2009), Barrios et al. (2009), Haugh et al. (2009) and Gerlach et al. (2010) nd liquidity
eects, which in some cases are quantitatively limited and only relevant for some countries.
In most of these papers, liquidity is measured by indicators based on transaction costs
(bid/ask spreads), trading volumes or bonds' outstanding amounts. Schwartz (2009) uses
a dierent liquidity measure, which consists of the yield spread between bonds issued by
KFW and German government bonds, and obtains a higher liquidity impact on euro area
sovereign spreads than usually found in the literature.2 According to Schwartz (2009),
this indicator captures the pricing of liquidity risk, i.e. the compensation that investors
demand for the possibility that market liquidity will worsen in the future.
The literature on euro area sovereign spreads has also focused on the identication of
changes in the relative importance of the determining factors over time.
In the rst years after the introduction of the single monetary policy, given the reduced
levels of yield spreads, the main question was the extent to which investors were no longer
discriminating government bonds by credit and liquidity risks. The empirical results
for the period suggest that credit risk has continued to play a role as a yield spread
determinant. This situation may, rstly, reect the perception that euro area countries
could reach an unsustainable scal situation despite the existence of the Stability and
Growth Pact and the excessive decit procedure and, secondly, the Maastricht Treaty's
"no bail-out clause". Regarding liquidity, the results are mixed. While Bernoth et al.
(2006) conclude that liquidity has ceased to have an impact on the determination of
1A Credit Default Swap is a nancial derivative that allows investors to hedge credit risk, i.e. protect themselves against
the possibility of a debt default.
2KFW is a banking group owned by the German State that aims to promote economic, social and ecological development.
KFW's bonds are explicitly guaranteed by the German government and have several characteristics similar to German
sovereign bonds, particularly in terms of taxes, issuance policy and investors base. In this context, KFW's yield spread
against German government bonds should essentially reect a liquidity premium.
5spreads, the results of G omez-Puig (2006) suggest that the relevance of liquidity in the
markets has increased with EMU.
In turn, the most recent literature focuses on the impact of the current economic
and nancial crisis. The empirical evidence for this period suggests an increase in the
importance of domestic factors, namely country credit risk and, to a lesser extent, liquidity
factors (e.g. Barrios et al. (2009), Ejsing and Sihvonen (2009) and Mody (2009)). The
results found by Mody (2009) suggest that, at the beginning of nancial market turmoil,
i.e. in the second half of 2007 and early 2008, spreads were largely determined by common
factors. During this period, the increases in international risk aversion lead to ight-to-
quality movements to German bonds. After the problems experienced by Bear Stearns
in mid March 2008, the dierent degrees of vulnerability of national nancial sectors
contributed to a dierentiation in yield spreads in euro area countries. The impact of
nancial sector risk on sovereign risk increased in the period following the collapse of
Lehman Brothers. The results of Ejsing and Lemke (2009), Attinasi et al. (2009) and
Gerlach et al. (2010) suggest that the vulnerabilities of national banking sectors and
governments' rescue packages contributed to a risk transfer from the nancial to the
public sector. After September 2008, country credit risk, in particular when evaluated by
public nance indicators, appears to have been a major underlying factor behind changes
in the yield spreads of euro area countries (Mody (2009), Sgherri and Zoli (2009), Barrios
et al. (2009) and Schuknecht et al. (2010)). According to Caceres et al. (2010), in
this period the risk of contagion among euro area countries was also a relevant factor in
determining the spreads.
3 Description and analysis of the data
The rst part of this section presents the data used in this study and discusses the potential
problems related with their interpretation. In the second part a brief analysis of data is
carried out as an introduction to the econometric analysis of the following section.
63.1 Data Description
In line with the previous section, the variables included in the model for euro area sovereign
spreads aim to capture the price of risk in international nancial markets, sovereign credit
risk premiums and liquidity premiums.
The countries under analysis are the rst twelve countries joining the euro area, with
the exception of Luxembourg. The sample period runs from January 2007 to the end of
2009 or mid May 2010, depending on the variables included in the specications. This
period includes a similar number of observations before and after the collapse of Lehman
Brothers, which helps the analysis of possible changes in the model determining sovereign
spreads given the current economic and nancial crisis. The variables for each country
are dened in dierences against Germany. The option of using Germany as the reference
country is justied by the fact that German government bonds have reinforced their safe
heaven and benchmark status during the current crisis, as a consequence of their relatively
high credit quality and liquidity.3
The yields on government bonds were calculated using the data from the MTS elec-
tronic trading platforms for securities with a residual maturity of around 5 and 10 years.4
Two types of alternative variables were used to measure country risk premiums: sovereign
CDS premiums and macroeconomic variables. The CDS data have the advantage of be-
ing available at a daily frequency, but must be carefully interpreted given that they can
be misleading measures of country credit risk premiums, particularly in the current con-
text. Changes in liquidity conditions in nancial markets may impact on CDS premiums
thus leading to possible under/over estimates of sovereign risk premiums.5 Additionally,
movements in sovereign CDS premiums may not only reect changes in the assessment
of the credit quality of the underlying country, but may also reect changes in global risk
perception prevailing in nancial markets.6 In these conditions, the use of macroeconomic
variables, in addition to their usefulness in providing greater insight on credit risk deter-
3One factor often mentioned as a determinant for the higher liquidity of German bonds is the existence of a highly
ecient and liquid derivatives market on these securities (EUREX stock exchange), which is not the case for government
bonds of other euro area countries. The results found by Ejsing and Sihvonen (2009) conrm the importance of this factor
and suggest that its impact on sovereign spreads has increased over the current crisis.
4The methodology used for the construction of all indicators obtained from the MTS database is described in the Annex
1.
5See Buhler and Trapp (2009) and Alexopoulou et al. (2009).
6According to the results of Alexopoulou et al. (2009), based on data up to October 2008, the common risk factors
have greatly increased their contribution to the CDS premiums of European rms during the current crisis.
7mining factors, is important for evaluating the robustness of the results obtained from
CDS data. The macroeconomic indicators considered were related to public nances and
the external position of each country. In particular, we constructed monthly series based
on forecasts released by the European Commission (EC), IMF and OECD, which aim
to reect the one-year-ahead forecast at any point of time. These series correspond to
a weighted average of the most recent forecasts for the current and the following years































i;j are the most recent forecasts available in
month i of year j for x at year j+1 released by the EC, IMF and OECD, respectively.
The use of these indicators instead of observed data appears to be more suitable for
explaining sovereign yield spreads in the current crisis, a period which has been charac-
terized by frequent reassessments of country credit risk.
Bond liquidity premiums are relatively dicult to evaluate empirically. On the one
hand, there is no consensual measure for liquidity in the literature. Empirical applica-
tions for gauging liquidity focus on several alternative indicators, which aim to capture
its dierent dimensions. On the other, obtaining representative data on the liquidity of
government bonds is also hindered by the fact that these securities are traded in several
markets, including non-organized markets for which no data are available. In the partic-
ular case of euro area government bonds, many studies construct liquidity measures from
the MTS database, given the high weight of these platforms in the secondary market
trading of European government bonds. In this study, we have used several alternative
measures to assess liquidity premiums.
Based on quotes and trade data from the MTS platforms for the period 2007-2009, we
obtained several liquidity indicators, expressed in relation to Germany. These included
measures of transaction costs (bid/ask spread - ba), volumes available for trade (average
volume of proposals posted at the best bid and ask prices - depth; and maximum volume
of proposals for the best three prices - max), transactions (trading volume - vol; and
number of transactions - trs), as well as the ratio between transaction costs and the
8volume available for trade (ask-side market depth - adepth).7 In general, the indicators
based on trade data (trs and vol) are more representative of market liquidity conditions
than those calculated from quotes. Nevertheless, given that quotes on MTS platforms
are binding, the quality of these data is also relatively good. Another reason to use the
quotes data is that they are available for a larger number of days, given the signicant
decline in the number of transactions in the crisis period.8
The liquidity indicators constructed from the MTS database have the advantage of
representing direct measures for the liquidity of the securities under analysis. However,
they also have the disadvantage of being highly dependent on the representativeness of
MTS platforms in the overall market. This situation is particularly relevant in the crisis
period, when unorganized over-the-counter markets have increased their importance vis-
 a-vis electronic platforms.9 During this period there have also been several regulatory
changes which may have contributed to a reduction of the MTS market share in several
countries.10
In order to overcome the distortions associated with changes in market structure, the
liquidity premiums were also assessed using measures not related with a specic market
infrastructure (indirect liquidity measures). Given that information and transaction costs
may decline with the dimension of the market, the relative size of each country's govern-
ment bond market was used as a liquidity premium proxy. This indicator was based on
the outstanding amounts of long term euro-denominated debt securities issued by euro
area central governments, published by the ECB. Additionally, as a proxy for the price of
liquidity risk, i.e. the risk that liquidity may deteriorate in the future, we calculated the
yield spreads between the 5 and 10 years bonds issued by KFW and German bonds with
similar maturities, in line with the approach adopted by Schwartz (2009).
Finally, the risk premium in international nancial markets was assessed by the rst
principal component of a set of variables, for the euro area and the United States, usually
found in the literature as measures of risk premiums in corporate bond markets and
7Details on the construction of liquidity measures are presented in the Annex 1.
8In 2007, the number of days with transactions was, on average, around 70 per cent of the number of days with
proposals. In 2008, this proportion decreased to around 40 per cent at the end of the year. In 2009, the number of days
with transactions increased progressively reaching a yearly average of 60 per cent.
9The greater diculty in performing transactions on large amounts on the electronic platforms without greatly aecting
the prices appears to have contributed for this change.
10Since 2008, several euro area countries have been allowing primary dealers to full their quote obligations on electronic
platforms other than MTS.
9uncertainty in nancial markets. The input variables were BBB corporate bond spreads,
several CDS indices for nancial and non-nancial sectors and stock and bond markets
implied volatilities.11
3.2 Analysis of the evolution of spreads and explanatory variables
Throughout the current crisis, there have been substantial changes in the path of sovereign
bond spreads in euro area countries. In the months following the collapse of Lehman
Brothers, there was a signicant widening of sovereign spreads (Figure 1). Between the
second quarter of 2009 and early summer, spreads moved generally downwards. Since
October 2009, the disclosure of a signicant deterioration in Greece's public nances
generated substantial concerns over their sustainability, which spilled over to other euro
area countries with weaker macroeconomic positions. In Greece, Portugal and, to a lesser
extent, Ireland, Spain and Italy, spreads were signicantly up in rst half 2010. Although
there was also an increase in other countries' spreads, they did not exceed the levels
recorded in the months following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.
The principal components of spreads and their determinants were calculated for the
purpose of evaluating the relevance of common factors to the path of these variables. The
rst principal components of the yield spreads, of the dierences with Germany in CDS
premiums and in bid/ask spreads explain, at least, about 75 percent of the respective
variances in the period 2007 to 2009.12 The major importance of the rst principal
components suggests that the evolution of sovereign risk and liquidity premiums may, to
a large extent, be determined by a single common factor. Indeed, in the sample period,
the rst principal components of yield spreads, of CDS premiums and of bid/ask spreads
dened against Germany are highly correlated either between each other or with the
international nancial markets global risk indicator or even with the KFW indicator,
designed to capture liquidity risk.
In the period under review, there appears to have been a change in the relevance of
11The option to compute the principal components derived from the fact that there is a certain variability in the
estimation results obtained from the individual variables. The rst principal component explains about 85 percent of the
variance of these variables.
12In the case of the MTS liquidity variables referring to quantities, the rst principal components explain lower propor-
tions, pointing to the greater importance of idiosyncratic factors. This may be explained by a higher sensitivity of quantities
to changes in market structure or to dierent market making rules in the domestic MTS platforms.



























































































































































































































































common factors explaining the spreads. To illustrate the evolution of the dispersion of
country spreads, Figure 2 presents the yield spreads coecient of variation. In the period
before the current crisis, this coecient tended to move downwards, which is in line with
the idea that the high liquidity prevailing in international nancial markets contributed to
a lower level of risk dierentiation. The fact that this downward trend continued through
the rst two months of 2008 suggests that, at the beginning of the crisis, the increase in
global risk aversion led to a ight to the government bond markets in general.13 Between
the liquidity problems with the Bear Stearns investment bank, in mid March, and until
September 2008, German bonds appear to have beneted from ight-to-quality move-
ments, but there is no evidence of signicant dierentiation among bonds of other euro
area countries. The increase in spreads observed in this period should, accordingly, have
mainly been determined by the reduction in risk appetite in nancial markets. The coef-
cient of variation increased, however, from late 2008 and, more markedly so, from late
October 2009, which suggests an increase in the importance of idiosyncratic factors. The
increased relevance of these factors took place in a context of the deteriorating outlook
13There was an increase in trading volumers on MTS platforms in this period.



















































































































































































































































































































































Coefficient of variation Mean (r-h-s)
Source: Thomson Reuters.
for public nances, initially due to the support measures for the nancial system and eco-
nomic stimulus plans, and later to the economic recession of 2009. These developments
suggest that, at least, part of the idiosyncratic spreads movements were associated with a
deterioration in credit quality in several countries. Indeed, the largest increases in spreads
since the onset of the nancial crisis, and especially since late 2009, occurred in countries
with an adverse macroeconomic situation at the onset of the crisis and/or where it has
deteriorated signicantly afterwards (Figure 3 and Figure 4).
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Figure 4: Macroeconomic imbalances and spreads evolution(a)
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Change in 10 year spreads
Oct/09-May/10 
Sources: ECB, European Commission and Thomson Reuters. 
Note: (a) Circle area = Change in 10 year government bond spread (unfilled circles correspond to negative values).
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134 Econometric Results
The rst part of this section presents the estimated results for euro area sovereign bond
spreads, when credit risk premiums are measured by the sovereign CDS spreads. Although
the data are available daily, the volatility of the series in several periods justies the use of
weekly averages. In the second part of the section, we present specications in which credit
risk is measured by macroeconomic variables, using monthly data. In both approaches,
the liquidity premium and risk premium in international nancial markets are evaluated
using the variables outlined in the previous section. The estimates were performed for
the period 2007-2009. In the last part of this section, the specication for the monthly
spreads has been re-estimated for a longer period, including data up to mid May 2010.
Both equations were estimated using a panel data approach (unbalanced panel). This
solution appears to be more appropriate to the small size of the sampling period, partic-
ularly in the specications based on monthly data. The characteristics of the data raise
several econometric problems. In addition to heterogeneity across countries (a typical
problem in cross section), the temporal dimension of the data and the (spatial) correla-
tion between countries must be taken into account, particularly given the single monetary
policy. The econometric method applied is the Pooled OLS, in which the variance and
covariance matrix of the residuals is obtained on the basis of the Driscoll and Kraay (1998)
approach. This method makes it possible to correct heteroscedasticity and simultaneously
to obtain robust residuals for temporal and country correlations.14;15
4.1 Credit risk premium measured by CDS
Equation (1) corresponds to the specication for the sovereign bond yield spreads of ten
euro area countries against Germany, for the period 2007-09, with data based on weekly
averages.
14The estimates were made in the STATA econometric programme, applying the command xtcss - Regression with
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.
15Given the temporal dimension of data, the impact of persistence in spreads was evaluated with the estimation of
regressions that include among the explanatory variables the lag of spreads (applying FGLS estimation methods for panel
data, correcting heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of residuals). In these specications, although the lagged term is
signicant, the conclusions concerning the impact of sovereign credit risk, liquidity risk and global risk remained broadly
unchanged.
14spreadm
i;t = c + 1cdsm
i;t + 2liqm
i;t + 3prt + 4lb + 5Ci + 6matm
i;t + 7Dm + um
i;t (1)
In this equation, i and t represent the country and the time period, respectively, while
m corresponds to the bonds' residual maturity (5 and 10 years). The variables spread, cds
and liq are, respectively, the sovereign bond yield, the CDS premium and the liquidity
indicator, all dened relative to Germany. The six MTS liquidity indicators are included
alternatively in the specication. The variable pr is a proxy for the risk premium in
international nancial markets. lb corresponds to a dummy that takes the value 1 in the
period following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. C represents the country dummies,
which make it possible to take into account the dierences in the average spread for each
country, which are not justied by the remaining variables. mat represents the dierence
between the average residual maturity of the bonds of country i and German bonds.16
Finally, the dummy Dm takes the value 1 for bonds with a residual maturity of 10 years.
Table 2 presents the estimated results of equation (1). The rst six columns include the
results when bonds with a residual maturity of 5 and 10 years are simultaneously used in
the estimation. The remaining columns display the results for each maturity individually.
The fact that the coecients of CDS spreads and nancial markets risk premium indicator
are statistically signicant and positive suggests the importance of credit risk and risk
aversion in international nancial markets in determining sovereign yield spreads. In the
case of liquidity indicators, there is some evidence of their relevance in explaining the
spreads for a residual maturity of 5 years. Namely, depth, max, adepth and vol have the
expected signals and are statistically signicant.
Given the relevance of the common component in the path of CDS premiums identied
in the previous section, it is important to assess to what extent the signicance of cds
does not stem solely from this component. The previous specications have therefore been
re-estimated replacing the CDS spreads by the residuals obtained in auxiliary regressions
performed for each country, in which the endogenous variable is the CDS spread and the
explanatory variables are a constant term and the rst principal component of the CDS
16This variable aims to control the eects arising from the fact that the yields for each maturity were based on bonds
with dierences in their residual maturity (albeit within a limited range), and from the fact that there are changes in the
bonds used throughout the series. The alternative of having estimated yields with constant maturity would not have been a
better solution given that, for some periods, there are many days with missing observations and the data is highly volatile.
15spreads. According to the results, presented in Table 3, CDS residuals are statistically
signicant, which conrms the relevance of idiosyncratic factors related with credit risk for
the determination of sovereign bond yield spreads. In general terms, there is an increase
in liquidity indicator coecients. For bonds with a maturity of 10 years, max, trs and vol
are now statistically signicant. The global risk factor coecient has also increased and
remains signicant. These developments are in line with the positive correlations between
the common component of CDS spreads, the common component of liquidity indicators
and the risk premium in nancial markets indicator.
The interaction between sovereign credit risk premiums, liquidity premiums and global
risk is further corroborated by the results of regressions that include, as an alternative to
the MTS variables, the indicator of liquidity risk kfw (Table 4). When kfw is included in
the regressions the global risk indicator loses statistical signicance. Additionally, in the
specications with the CDS residuals the t-ratio of kfw is higher than with CDS spreads.
To identify possible changes in the relation between the sovereign spreads and the
respective determinants arising from the crisis, equation (1) was re-estimated to include
the interaction terms between the dummy lb and the variables related with global risk,
sovereign credit risk and liquidity. The results, which are presented in Table 5, conrm the
relevance of global risk aversion for the determination of spreads.17 In the regressions with
the CDS spread, its impact has not changed with the deepening of the crisis. However,
in the regressions with the CDS residual, there is some evidence of an additional impact
on spreads. With regard to sovereign credit risk, the results suggest an increase in its
contribution with the deepening of the crisis. In the regressions with the CDS residuals,
the fact that only the interaction term is signicant suggests that prior to the collapse of
Lehman Brothers spreads were not signicantly determined by idiosyncratic credit risk
factors. The results for liquidity are not conclusive.
In short, the above analysis suggests that an increase in the global risk premium in
nancial markets has a positive and signicant impact on euro area government bond
yield spreads. This global risk premium presents a co-movement with variables that cap-
ture the common evolution in credit and liquidity risk premiums, which suggest it might
17The conclusions for the regressions with the interaction terms do not change when maturities of 5 and 10 years are
estimated separately.
16have aected such premiums. The econometric results also support the relevance of the
idiosyncratic factors in determining credit and liquidity risk premiums and suggest that
markets penalised more countries with higher sovereign credit risk after mid September
2008. The results based on MTS indicators point to a higher impact of liquidity on 5 year
maturity than on 10 year maturity.
4.2 Credit risk premium measured by macroeconomic variables
4.2.1 Data up to end 2009
In this subsection sovereign credit risk is measured by macroeconomic variables instead
of CDS spreads. Macroeconomic data are not aected by changes in liquidity conditions
or by changes in the risk premium in nancial markets. This approach therefore enables
us to evaluate the robustness of the importance of country credit risk, as measured by
CDS spreads, found in previous specications.
The path of credit risk premiums in euro area countries is likely to have reected
not only developments in economies over time, but also the baseline position concerning
macroeconomic imbalances. Therefore, in addition to macroeconomic forecasts, explana-
tory variables also include the international investment position and public debt, as a
percentage of GDP, at the end of 2006, i.e. in the period preceding the beginning of the
sample.
In this context, we tested several specications. We found evidence that the initial
macroeconomic situation of each economy is relevant in determining the average level of
spreads. We also noted that changes in spreads over time are related to the outlook for
the public nances. Table 6 displays the results of the estimation of equation (2).
spreadm




i;t + 6prt + 7lb + 8Dm + um
i;t (2)
In addition to the previously dened variables, soi;t corresponds to the forecast in t
(for the one-year-ahead period) of the scal balance, as a percentage of GDP, for country
i against Germany. div06
i and iip06
i respectively represent the dierentials with Germany
in the public debt and international investment position of country i at the end of 2006
(both as a percentage of GDP). Finally, share06
i represents the relative size of the public
17debt market in country i in late 2006, dened in comparison to Germany.
The fact that the coecient of scal balance is negative and statistically signicant in-
dicates that a deterioration in the outlook for the scal balance in comparison to Germany
leads to an increase in the spread. The public debt and international investment position
coecients are also signicant, suggesting that the dierences between the average levels
of spreads in the various countries are related to macroeconomic imbalances. Countries
which, in late 2006, already had higher public debt ratios or poorer international invest-
ment positions should have noted, only taking these eects into account, an average level
of spreads higher than countries with a more favourable macroeconomic position. In the
case of liquidity indicators, the results suggest that the size of the long term government
bond market has a favourable impact on the average level of spreads.18 For the MTS
variables, the indicators based on quotes data (ba, depth, max and adepth) are generally
signicant and have the expected signals. The fact that the indicators associated with
transactions (vol and trs) are not signicant may possibly be due to the fact that, in
months with a low level of trading activity, the monthly averages do not correctly reect
market liquidity. The results conrm the higher relevance of liquidity for bonds with a
residual maturity of 5 years. The risk premium in nancial markets coecient remains
positive and statistically signicant.
In line with the approach for weekly data, Table 7 presents the results of equation (2)
when the cross-terms with the dummy lb are included. These results conrm the sharper
impact of the macroeconomic situation in the period following the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers. The results even suggest that the outlook for scal balances only began to aect
yield spreads with the deepening of the crisis. With regard to liquidity, when measured by
share06, there is evidence of an increased eect. The conclusions based on MTS variables
are still not clear. The interaction term for the risk premium in nancial markets suggests
that in the period of deepening of the crisis there were no signicant changes in the way
in which risk aversion in nancial markets aected spreads.
Figure 5 compares the levels of observed spreads with those estimated for the period
18The variable corresponding to the evolution over time of each country's share of the euro area long term government
bond market (dened relative to Germany) also presents a negative and signicant coecient when included in the equation
(2), as an alternative to share06. However, the results with this variable are unstable, which may suggest they are also
capturing sovereign credit risk eects. In fact, changes in the sovereign debt outstanding amounts in the current crisis were
largely determined by increased public sector borrowing requirements.
18before and after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. It also provides a breakdown of
estimated spreads by their determinants. The estimated gures capture relatively well the
levels of spreads, both in the period prior to and after the collapse of Lehman Brothers.19
With regard to the breakdown of spreads, the results illustrate the reduction of the relative
importance of the global risk factor during the economic and nancial crisis. Although
in absolute terms this variable's contribution to the level of spreads has increased from
about 15 bp to about 35 bp, in relative terms it declined, on average, from around 70
per cent to around 50 per cent. The contributions made by credit risk and liquidity
premiums increased both in absolute terms in the period following the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers. In most countries the liquidity premium increased in comparison to
credit risk premium.
Figure 6 provides a breakdown of changes in spreads for dierent periods. Between
January 2007 and August 2008, the increase in spreads was determined by increased
risk aversion in nancial markets. In the months following the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers, the risk premium in nancial markets continued to contribute to a widening of
spreads, although it was no longer the main factor behind changes in spreads. In that
period, most countries witnessed a signicant increase in the liquidity premium and, to
a lesser extent, in the credit risk premium. The narrowing of spreads recorded between
March and September 2008 reected a reduction in the risk premium in international
nancial markets, as well as slight reductions in liquidity premiums. These developments
were, however, partially oset by an increase in sovereign risk premiums in most countries.
In the last quarter of 2009, country credit risk explained the increases in spreads. In
general, the evolution of liquidity premiums was more relevant for changes in spreads of
bonds with maturities of 5 as opposed to 10 years, while credit risk contribution was
higher for 10 year maturity bonds.
To sum up, the results based on macroeconomic data up to the end of 2009 conrm
that, while in the period before the collapse of Lehman Brothers global risk aversion was
the main factor determining the spreads, with the deepening of the crisis there was an
increase in the relevance of idiosyncratic factors.
19The chart is based on the results of Table 7 for the specication (4) when maturities of 5 and 10 years are estimated
separately. The use of the alternative specications does not lead to signicant dierences in the results.
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Sources: ECB, European Commission, IMF, MTS, OECD and authors’ calculations.
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214.2.2 Data up to March 2010
The analysis performed in section 3 suggests that the widening in euro area sovereign
spreads recorded from late 2009 was related with an increase in the importance of coun-
try specic factors and, in particular, the increased possibility of default by several coun-
tries. This period of renewed turbulence in euro area sovereign bond markets was largely
triggered by the perception that Greece's public nances were on an unsustainable path.
These concerns spilled over rapidly to other euro area countries such as Portugal, Ireland,
Italy and Spain, with a poorer level of economic performance, giving rise to some concerns
over the stability of the euro area as a whole.
In this subsection we have re-estimated the previous specications for a sample period
extended to May 2010. The cut-o date was May 9, in order to exclude possible eects
arising from the Eurosystem's purchases of euro area government debt securities in the
secondary market, under the Securities Market Programme. As we do not have MTS
data for 2010, liquidity premiums are measured only by the variable share06, while yield
spreads are calculated using the yields on benchmark bonds with residual maturities of
5 and 10 years provided by Thomson Reuters (which do not dier signicantly from the
yields obtained from the MTS database). The exclusion of MTS variables does not change
the conclusions for the period 2007-09.
The results based on data up to May 2010 are given in Table 8. In addition to the
previously dened variables, lb* corresponds to a dummy with the value 1 for the pe-
riod between the collapse of Lehman Brothers and October 2009, while nov takes the
value 1 for the subsequent period. In line with previous subsections, the table also in-
cludes a specication containing the interaction terms with the temporal dummies. In
the regression without these cross terms, all variables have the expected signals and are
statistically signicant. The results of the specication with the cross terms conrm that
spreads' sensitivity to country factors has changed in the current crisis. Both in the case
of macroeconomic variables, which aim to capture sovereign credit risk, and the liquidity
variable the coecients of cross terms with the dummy nov are higher than those of the
cross terms with the dummy lb*. This result conrms the analysis in section 3, which
suggested that there had been an increase in the impact of each economy's specic factors
22since the end of 2008, and, more sharply so, since October 2009. In turn, the impact of
the risk premium in nancial markets remained unchanged until October 2009, increasing
thereafter.
5 Final Remarks
Euro area government bond spreads to Germany, noted since early 2007, can largely
be explained by dierences between countries regarding the creditworthiness of national
governments, liquidity in domestic bond markets, as well as by the risk premium in in-
ternational nancial markets. This latter factor is strongly correlated with the principal
components of the sovereign CDS premiums and of the bid/ask spreads, dened in com-
parison to Germany, as well as with an indicator of the liquidity risk in euro area bond
markets. This situation suggests that the decline in risk appetite in international nancial
markets noted during the current crisis has amplied the credit and liquidity risk premi-
ums of euro area bonds against Germany. After the deepening of the crisis in September
2008, idiosyncratic factors have increased their eect on spreads reecting both the ad-
verse developments in sovereign credit risk and deteriorating liquidity conditions, but also
the fact that markets have gone to penalize more the interest rates of countries with ma-
jor macroeconomic imbalances and/or less liquid sovereign debt markets. The increase in
sovereign credit risk premiums has been more marked in countries whose scal balance
outlook has deteriorated more and/or in countries which, prior to the onset of the crisis,
already had higher public debt ratios and poorer international investment positions. In
turn, there has been a greater increase in liquidity premiums in countries with smaller
public debt markets.
In the period before the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the risk premium in nancial
markets accounted, on average, for around 70 percent of euro area sovereign bond yield
spreads. Since September 2008, the indicators for country dierences in terms of credit
quality and liquidity have played a more important role in determining the yield spreads.
These indicators, as a whole, accounted for around 50 per cent of the average level of
spreads noted between September 2008 and December 2009. Dierences between countries
in terms of liquidity were particularly important in explaining the increase in yield spreads
23in the months following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. In turn, idiosyncratic credit risk
factors appear, to a large extent, to explain the increase in spreads at the end of 2009. In
the rst ve months of 2010, the evolution of spreads was largely determined by greater
heterogeneity in sovereign credit risk premiums, together with a further increase in risk
aversion in nancial markets. In general, the evolution of liquidity premiums were more
relevant for changes in spreads of 5 year maturity bonds, while credit risk contribution
was higher for the 10 year maturity bonds.
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26Annex 1
Indicators computed from the MTS database
The MTS platforms are the main electronic trading system for the secondary whole-
sale market trading of European bonds. In these platforms there are two types of market
participants: primary dealers and dealers. The primary dealers are required to formulate
two-way proposals on a given number of bonds. Primary dealers may also formulate pro-
posals on any other bonds and issue orders for proposals submitted by other participants.
Dealers can only issue orders for proposals formulated by the primary dealers. The euro
area government bonds can be traded in the EuroMTS and in the domestic MTS markets.
In the EuroMTS only benchmark bonds are admitted to trading (bonds that satisfy some
requirements in terms of principal amount outstanding and number of primary dealers),
while in MTS domestic markets the entire curve of the respective government securities
can be traded.
MTS database contains high frequency (tick-by-tick) trade and quote data both on
EuroMTS and MTS domestic markets. For quotes, the data include the three best bid
and ask proposals (price and quantity) at each moment for each security. The trade data
include prices and quantities eectively traded. Based on this information, we constructed
several liquidity indicators: dierence between the best bid and ask prices as a percentage
of the average quoted price (ba - bid/ask spread) (1); average volume available for trade,
in million euros, at best bid and ask prices (depth) (2); maximum volume, in million euros,
within quantities available for the three best bid and ask prices (max) (3); the ratio of
the dierence between the best ask price and the average price on the volume available
for sale at that price (adepth - ask-side market depth) (4); trading volume in millions of







20Other indicators computed were: the liquidity index (Bollen and Whaley (1998)); an indicator similar to adepth but
based on bid quotes data; the average volume of daily transactions; and the eective bid/ask spread. The results for these
indicators are not included in the paper as they have never been statistically signicant in explaining government bonds





max = max(volask1;volask2;volask3;volbid1;volbid2;volbid3) (3)
adepth =
[pask1   (pask1 + pbid1)=2]
volask1
(4)
in which: pask1, pask2 and pask3 correspond to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd highest ask prices,
pbid1, pbid2 and pbid3 correspond to 1st, 2nd and 3rd lowest bid prices, while volaski and
volbidi are volumes of proposals associated with these prices.
The bid/ask spread captures transaction costs and increases in periods of reduced
liquidity. By contrast, the indicators based on quantities available for trade (depth and
max), as well as the volume and the number of transactions (vol and trs) are expected
to increase in periods of higher liquidity. Finally, adepth should increase when liquidity
declines. This indicator combines price and volume data and is particularly useful when
the two types of information give mixed signals (for example, when bid/ask spreads are
low, but the market may not be liquid enough for the transaction of large volumes).
The previous indicators were constructed with data from the MTS domestic markets,
for xed coupon governments bonds denominated in euros and with benchmark status.
By using only xed-coupon bonds we minimized the distortions that would have arisen
from the inclusion of bonds with dierent characteristics, such as variable interest rate,
bonds generated by coupon-stripping programs or ination-linked bonds. Additionally,
the use of benchmark bonds ensures that only the most liquid bonds were used, which
also increases the degree of comparability between dierent securities. Finally, we decided
to use domestic markets data because, for the same bond, the average traded volume and
the number of transactions were higher in these markets than in the EuroMTS, and the
bid/ask spreads were very similar in both markets.21
The indicators for daily transactions - vol and trs - correspond, respectively, to the sum
of traded volumes and number of transactions recorded each day. In turn, the indicators
21The trs and vol indicators were also computed as the sum of domestic platforms and EuroMTS data. However, the
econometric results did not dier from the indicators calculated with only domestic markets data.
28using quotes - ba, depth, max and adepth - were calculated for each intra-day observation
and then converted into daily data using the median, in order to eliminate outliers. The
same procedure was applied to compute daily yields for each bond. The average prices
implicit in the best bid and ask quotes at each moment ((pask1+pbid1)=2) were converted
using daily median values, which were then used with other characteristics of the same
bond to compute the yields-to-maturity.
Finally, in order to obtain representative liquidity indicators and yields for maturities
of 5 and 10 years, we computed for each country the averages daily data of bonds with
a daily residual maturity in the 4-6 or 9-11 year ranges, respectively. This aggregation
increases the number of daily observations, particularly during periods of low liquidity
in the markets and has the additional advantage of mitigating eects arising from the
behaviour of a particular bond.22 The nal government bond yields we have obtained do
not dier signicantly from those released by Thomson Reuters. This conrms that the
maturity intervals adopted in the aggregation of data were reasonable.
22A preliminary analysis showed the series obtained presented a similar trend to those computed with smaller ranges,
but with less missing observations.
29Table 1: Panel A - Summary of empirical results for euro area sovereign bond yield spreads: results for the pre-crisis period
Endogenous Endogenous Endogenous Endogenous Sovereign credit  Sovereign credit  Sovereign credit  Sovereign credit 
risk risk risk risk
Liquidity Liquidity Liquidity Liquidity
(b) (b) (b) (b) Global risk Global risk Global risk Global risk
Jan/96-Dec/01 (daily)
EA11 excluding  GR
1993-2005
EA11 + United Kingdom, 
Sweden and Denmark
Jan/99-May/02 (Weekly)





EA11 excluding GR and IE
Apr/03-Dec/04
EA excluding IE
(b) MTS means that the liquidity indicators were based on the MTS database. See Annex 1 for further details on these indicators.
Credit risk. Liquidity premiums  vanished with the start of the EMU for euro-
denominated debt market. Global risk has impact on bonds denominated in USD 
but not on bonds denominated in DEM (EUR).
Paper Paper Paper Paper Sample Sample Sample Sample
(a) (a) (a) (a) Variables Variables Variables Variables
Conclusion: main spread determinants Conclusion: main spread determinants Conclusion: main spread determinants Conclusion: main spread determinants
Goméz-Puig 
(2006)
10y against DE Ratings
bid/ask spreads; outstanding 
volume of bonds 
- Credit risk and liquidity. The importance of liquidity increased after the EMU.
Bernoth et al. 
(2006) 
Spread against DE or 
US at issuance date
Public finances Outstanding amount of bonds Corporate bond spreads (US)
Global risk. In some countries, spreads are explained by the interaction between 
the global risk and debt-to-GDP ratios. Liquidity factors play a smaller role. 
Geyer et al. 
(2004)
2-9y against DE
Current account and 
business cycle 
variables
Spread between 4y yields of 
bonds with different issue size; 
on-the-run/off-the-run yield 
spread
Corporate bond spreads (EA) 
and swap spread (Germany)
Global risk. No significant impact of macroeconomic or liquidity-related variables.
Codogno et al. 
(2003)
10y against DE Public finances; CDS
Trading volume, turnover ratio, 
number of transactions, bid/ask 
spread (MTS)
Corporate bond and swap 
spreads (US)
(a) EA11 corresponds to the first 11 euro area countries, excluding Luxemburg, i.e.  Austria (AU), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL), and Portugal (PT).
Credit risk and liquidity. The bulk of spreads is explained by credit risk, though 
liquidity plays a non-trivial role for low credit risk countries and in periods of 
market stress. 
Favero et al. 
(2008)
10y against DE and 5y 
against FR
- bid/ask spread (MTS) Swap spread (US)
Global risk. Liquidity differentials are priced only for a sub set of countries and 
the interaction of liquidity with the global risk is always negative when significant. 
When the interaction term is not included, liquidity becomes insignificant.









0Table 1: Panel B - Summary of empirical results for euro area bond spreads: including the crisis period
Endogenous Endogenous Endogenous Endogenous Sovereign credit  Sovereign credit  Sovereign credit  Sovereign credit 
risk risk risk risk
Liquidity Liquidity Liquidity Liquidity
(b) (b) (b) (b) Global risk Global risk Global risk Global risk
Apr/07-Mar/08 (daily)













Jul/07-Mar/09 (weekly and 
monthly)
EA11
Mar/03-Apr/09 (weekly and 
quarterly)
EA11 excluding FI and IE
1991- mid May/09
EA11 + United Kingdom, 
Sweden and Denmark
Dec/05-Jun/09 (quarterly 






(b) MTS means that the liquidity indicators were based on the MTS database. See Annex 1 for further details on these indicators.
(a) EA11 corresponds to the first 11 euro area countries, excluding Luxemburg, i.e. Austria (AU), Belgium (BE), Germany (DE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL), and 
Portugal (PT).
(c) Other variables included: Mody (2009) — Ratio of the  financial sector equity index divided by the overall equity index (to capture each economy's financial sector outlook) and yield on the Bund (to capture flight-to-quality movements); 
Sgherri and Zoli (2009) — Expected Default Frequencies of the median financial institution in each country, projected growth and current account imbalances; Attinasi et al. (2009) - Announcement dates of banking rescue packages, amount 
provided for banks recapitalization and government guarantees; and Caceres et al. (2010) - probability of distress of a country conditional on other countries (to capture contagion).




outlook; size and 
equity ratio of the 
banking sector
bid/ask spread Corporate bond spreads (US) 
Global risk is the main driver. It also plays an indirect role through its 
interaction with the size and the structure of national banking sectors. Credit 
risk (based on debt levels and forecasts of future fiscal deficits) is also a 
significant determinant of spreads. Liquidity is priced in sovereign bond markets 
but its quantitative importance is small.
Global risk, credit risk and contagion effects between countries.
Haugh et al. 
(2009)
10y against DE Public finances  outstanding amounts of bonds Corporate bond spreads (US) 
Global risk, credit risk and liquidity. The impact of credit risk and liquidity on 
spreads is amplified by the interaction with general risk aversion. 
Caceres et al. 
(2010)
(c) 10y against swaps  Public finances  -
Estimated global risk aversion 
index
After Sep/08: markets penalize fiscal imbalances much more strongly; the impact 
on spread due to higher general risk aversion also increased; liquidity remains 
insignificant
Barrios et al. 
(2009)
10y against DE Public finances; CDS bid/ask spreads (MTS) Principal component
Global risk. Credit risk and liquidity appear to be smaller but non-negligible 
drivers of spreads and their effect increased with the crisis. The combination of 
high risk aversion and  large current account deficits tend to magnify the impact 
of deterioration of the public finances on spreads.
Schuknecht et al. 
(2010)
Spread against DE or 
US at issuance date
Public finances  Size of the issuance
Corporate bond spreads (US) 
and short term interest rate
Global risk, but also credit and liquidity risks. The announcement of bank rescue 
packages has an impact on spreads, through a transfer of risk from the banking 
sector to government. However, the size of the rescue package does not have a 
statistically significant effect. 
Sgherri and Zoli 
(2009)
(c) 10y against DE
Public finances 
outlook
Market value of long term 
government bonds denominated 
in EUR
Principal component
Global risk. Since Oct/08, the sensitivity of sovereign spreads to projected debt 
changes and, in several countries, to the solvency of the national banking system 
has increased. Liquidity plays a significant, albeit quite limited, role in 
explaining spreads.
Attinasi et al. 
(2009)
(c) 10y against DE
Public finances 
outlook
Size of government bond 
market; trading volume 
Corporate bond spreads (US) 
Weekly changes in spreads: before Jul/07 no obvious determinants; Jul/07-
Mar/08 (Bear Stearns) global factors; Mar/08-Sep/08 differentiation in spreads 
led by outlook for the financial domestic sector; After Sep/08 in countries with 
long term erosion of competitiveness the influence of public debt ratios on the 
changes in spreads increased.
Ejsing and 
Lemke (2009)
CDS 5y - -
iTraxx non financial 
corporations
Bank and sovereign CDS premiums are explained by a common risk factor. After 
Oct/08, with the financial rescue package, the sensitivity of bank CDS premiums 
to the common risk factor declined, while the sensitivity of sovereign CDS 
premiums increased.
Moody (2009) 
(c) 10y against DE Public debt - CDS banks (US)
Before the onset of crisis all variables, excluding the MTS liquidity indicators, 




10y against DE Ratings
Liquidity premium determined 
endogenously based on AAA 
bonds
Swap spread (USA)
Spreads have a positive relation with short term interest rates, which have an 
effect on credit and liquidity premiums. A deterioration of country credit quality 
increases the sensitivity of spreads to interest rates. In addition to short term 




2, 5 and 10y against 
DE
CDS
bid/ask spread, depth,  
liquidity index (MTS); average 
issue size; dummy for bonds 
deliverable for German futures 
contracts
-
Credit risk and liquidity. Larger impact of liquidity on spreads than previously 
found in the literature.
Paper Paper Paper Paper Sample Sample Sample Sample
(a) (a) (a) (a) Variables Variables Variables Variables
Conclusion: main spread determinates Conclusion: main spread determinates Conclusion: main spread determinates Conclusion: main spread determinates
Schwartz (2009)
2, 5 and 10y against 
DE
CDS
Yield spread between bonds 




1Table 2: Results of spreads estimation in the period 2007-2009: credit risk measured by CDS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
cds 0.854*** 0.851*** 0.848*** 0.851*** 0.873*** 0.872*** 0.867*** 0.862*** 0.859*** 0.868*** 0.890*** 0.889*** 0.834*** 0.844*** 0.826*** 0.807*** 0.860*** 0.859***
(24.64) (24.09) (23.45) (24.58) (28.41) (28.35) (21.27) (21.06) (20.91) (21.20) (24.25) (24.25) (21.49) (21.49) (20.32) (18.36) (24.63) (24.60)
pr 0.0308*** 0.0308*** 0.0309*** 0.0306*** 0.0312*** 0.0311*** 0.0243** 0.0241** 0.0246** 0.0242** 0.0265** 0.0264** 0.0355*** 0.0374*** 0.0367*** 0.0355*** 0.0362*** 0.0361***
(4.21) (4.18) (4.21) (4.15) (4.13) (4.12) (2.76) (2.69) (2.66) (2.72) (3.08) (3.07) (5.07) (5.61) (5.65) (5.04) (5.21) (5.20)
lb 0.0849** 0.0913*** 0.0896*** 0.0850** 0.0871** 0.0875** 0.158*** 0.162** 0.166*** 0.157*** 0.158*** 0.159*** 0.0133 0.0205 0.0179 0.0167 0.0119 0.0119
(2.87) (3.13) (3.00) (2.88) (2.70) (2.72) (4.47) (4.72) (4.78) (4.45) (4.37) (4.38) (0.43) (0.66) (0.58) (0.55) (0.37) (0.37)
mat 0.0874*** 0.0877*** 0.0867*** 0.0868*** 0.0738*** 0.0735*** 0.0531** 0.0533** 0.0535** 0.0532* 0.0438 0.0432 0.0899*** 0.0917*** 0.0855** 0.0883*** 0.0726*** 0.0737***
(5.41) (5.49) (5.42) (5.35) (3.82) (3.83) (2.91) (2.89) (2.92) (2.90) (1.68) (1.66) (5.16) (5.06) (4.51) (5.28) (3.80) (3.83)
Dmat 0.0858*** 0.0841*** 0.0800*** 0.0853*** 0.0936*** 0.0940***
(6.43) (6.06) (4.99) (6.35) (6.97) (7.01)
ba -0.00533 -0.0117* 0.0551
(-1.01) (-1.95) (0.89)
depth -1.612 -0.852 -2.978**
(-1.63) (-0.67) (-2.88)
max -0.641 -0.696 -2.178**
(-1.37) (-1.27) (-3.12)
adepth 0.0000528 -0.000134 0.00139**
(0.40) (-1.39) (2.28)
trs -0.00106 -0.000660 -0.00193
(-1.28) (-0.87) (-1.47)
vol -0.176 -0.112 -0.316*
(-1.56) (-1.09) (-1.85)
constant 0.0320 0.0207 0.0256 0.0309 0.0579 0.0585 0.164** 0.152** 0.143** 0.162** 0.194** 0.195** 0.00314 -0.00678 -0.000427 0.00698 0.0265 0.0276
(1.28) (0.83) (1.01) (1.23) (2.05) (2.09) (4.49) (4.29) (4.21) (4.40) (3.98) (4.01) (0.11) (-0.23) (-0.02) (0.24) (0.90) (0.95)
country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3066 3066 3066 3066 2479 2479 1534 1534 1534 1534 1237 1237 1532 1532 1532 1532 1242 1242
R-sq 0.902 0.902 0.902 0.902 0.911 0.911 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.927 0.927 0.898 0.899 0.900 0.899 0.902 0.902
All bonds 10 year residual maturity bonds 5 year residual maturity bonds
Notes: The table presents the estimated coefficients and the respective significance levels (*** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%). The t-statistics are presented in brackets. cds represents the CDS premium; pr corresponds to the risk
premium in international financial markets; lb is a dummy for the period after the collapse of Lehman Brothers; mat corresponds to a maturity variable; Dmat has the value 1 for bonds with 10 year residual maturity; ba, 
depth, max, adepth, trs  and vol correspond to liquidity indicators based on MTS data. The variables for each country are defined in differences against Germany.
3
2Table 3: Results of spreads estimation in the period 2007-2009: credit risk measured by CDS residuals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
u_cds 0.800*** 0.801*** 0.792*** 0.787*** 0.839*** 0.837*** 0.828*** 0.829*** 0.827*** 0.823*** 0.879*** 0.877*** 0.737*** 0.771*** 0.742*** 0.684*** 0.794*** 0.793***
(28.58) (27.95) (27.50) (24.83) (34.35) (34.28) (21.78) (21.53) (21.93) (20.62) (23.59) (23.56) (22.90) (24.84) (24.63) (18.85) (28.20) (28.13)
pr 0.0764*** 0.0770*** 0.0768*** 0.0755*** 0.0783*** 0.0781*** 0.0716*** 0.0718*** 0.0728*** 0.0712*** 0.0755*** 0.0754*** 0.0756*** 0.0821*** 0.0795*** 0.0734*** 0.0813*** 0.0810***
(6.33) (6.32) (6.40) (6.33) (6.68) (6.67) (5.88) (5.84) (5.76) (5.87) (6.47) (6.46) (5.96) (6.54) (6.55) (5.82) (6.48) (6.47)
lb 0.285*** 0.296*** 0.296*** 0.283*** 0.297*** 0.298*** 0.345*** 0.353*** 0.364*** 0.343*** 0.348*** 0.348*** 0.221*** 0.238*** 0.228*** 0.215*** 0.243*** 0.242***
(6.90) (7.17) (7.35) (6.93) (7.20) (7.23) (9.24) (9.79) (9.93) (9.27) (8.70) (8.73) (4.85) (4.86) (4.91) (4.88) (5.10) (5.12)
mat 0.0418* 0.0436* 0.0422* 0.0406* 0.0258 0.0254 0.00522 0.00573 0.00692 0.00535 -0.00270 -0.00350 0.0340 0.0363 0.0281 0.0337 0.0122 0.0142
(1.84) (1.94) (1.89) (1.78) (0.97) (0.96) (0.18) (0.20) (0.24) (0.19) (-0.08) (-0.10) (1.25) (1.25) (0.96) (1.38) (0.38) (0.45)
Dmat 0.108*** 0.106*** 0.0927*** 0.107*** 0.114*** 0.115***
(9.25) (8.59) (6.11) (9.03) (9.39) (9.45)
ba 0.00874 -0.000203 0.150
(1.14) (-0.04) (1.54)
depth -2.729** -1.579 -4.109**
(-2.26) (-1.07) (-2.79)
max -1.780*** -1.727* -3.606**
(-3.03) (-2.12) (-4.69)
adepth 0.000429 0.000139 0.00317***
(1.50) (0.84) (4.25)
trs -0.00203** -0.00179* -0.00308*
(-2.53) (-2.13) (-2.13)
vol -0.327** -0.284* -0.513**
(-2.77) (-2.41) (-2.49)
constant 0.221*** 0.205*** 0.204*** 0.217*** 0.261*** 0.261*** 0.390*** 0.375*** 0.344*** 0.385*** 0.426*** 0.426*** 0.173*** 0.170** 0.170*** 0.173*** 0.228*** 0.229***
(7.25) (6.56) (7.40) (7.33) (7.46) (7.53) (9.83) (9.87) (10.26) (9.82) (8.77) (8.80) (5.00) (4.64) (5.24) (5.51) (5.86) (5.93)
country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3066 3066 3066 3066 2479 2479 1534 1534 1534 1534 1237 1237 1532 1532 1532 1532 1242 1242
R-sq 0.853 0.854 0.855 0.854 0.871 0.871 0.873 0.874 0.875 0.874 0.899 0.899 0.838 0.837 0.841 0.844 0.843 0.844
All bonds 10 year residual maturity bonds 5 year residual maturity bonds
Notes: The table presents the estimated coefficients and the respective significance levels (*** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%). The t-statistics are presented in brackets. u_cds represents the CDS residuals
from auxiliary regressions; pr corresponds to the risk premium in international financial markets; lb is a dummy for the period after the collapse of Lehman Brothers; mat corresponds to a maturity
variable; Dmat has the value 1 for bonds with 10 year residual maturity; ba, depth, max, adepth, trs and vol correspond to liquidity indicators based on MTS data. The interaction terms between
dummy lb and the other variables are identified by _lb at the end of the variable name. The variables for each country are defined in differences against Germany.
3
3Table 4: Results of spreads estimation in the period 2007-2009: credit risk measured by CDS and CDS
residuals.
Regressions with kfw
(1) (2) (1) (2)
credit 0.845*** 0.838*** 0.804*** 0.799***
(25.60) (24.00) (28.00) (27.40)
pr -0.0162 0.0205
(-1.92) (1.54)
kfw 0.00593*** 0.00435*** 0.00707*** 0.00909***
(9.57) (7.08) (5.44) (7.72)
lb 0.0840** 0.0715** 0.282*** 0.301***
(3.78) (3.68) (8.29) (10.04)
mat 0.0830*** 0.0826*** 0.0389 0.0378
(5.54) (5.54) (1.94) (1.89)
Dmat 0.0629*** 0.0694*** 0.0809*** 0.0730***
(7.20) (8.44) (7.38) (5.15)
constant -0.172*** -0.107*** -0.0261 -0.102***
(-6.01) (-4.83) (-0.53) (-4.81)
country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3066 3066 3066 3066
R-sq 0.913 0.912 0.869 0.867
credit=cds credit=u_cds
Notes: The table presents the estimated coefficients and the respective significance
levels (*** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%). The t-statistics are presented in brackets. cds 
represents the CDS premium; u_cds represents the CDS residuals from auxiliary
regressions; pr corresponds to the risk premium in international financial markets;
lb is a dummy for the period after the collapse of Lehman Brothers; mat 
corresponds to a maturity variable; Dmat has the value 1 for bonds with 10 year
residual maturity; kfw is the spreads of KFW bonds. The variables for each
country are defined in differences against Germany.
34Table 5: Results of spreads estimation in the period 2007-2009: credit risk measured by CDS and CDS
residuals
Regressions with interaction terms with time dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
credit 0.330** 0.320** 0.316** 0.323** 0.290* 0.314** 0.233 0.217 0.204 0.212 0.233 0.260
(2.39) (2.27) (2.13) (2.34) (1.86) (2.09) (1.51) (1.42) (1.34) (1.34) (1.34) (1.56)
credit_lb 0.511*** 0.522*** 0.516*** 0.514*** 0.566*** 0.538*** 0.552*** 0.550*** 0.549*** 0.561** 0.592*** 0.558**
(3.95) (4.03) (3.92) (3.95) (3.89) (3.87) (3.84) (3.87) (3.93) (3.84) (3.66) (3.61)
pr 0.0313*** 0.0367*** 0.0374*** 0.0323*** 0.0375*** 0.0363*** 0.0459*** 0.0512*** 0.0521*** 0.0467*** 0.0507*** 0.0507***
(5.20) (6.11) (5.70) (5.68) (5.64) (5.65) (8.02) (10.86) (11.39) (8.57) (11.02) (11.14)
pr_lb 0.0104 0.00455 0.00378 0.00912 0.00787 0.00980 0.0439** 0.0389* 0.0340 0.0421* 0.0447** 0.0448**

























mat 0.0824*** 0.0839*** 0.0828*** 0.0819*** 0.0671*** 0.0655*** 0.0428* 0.0458** 0.0458** 0.0418* 0.0272 0.0248
(5.77) (5.87) (5.72) (5.70) (3.95) (3.90) (1.98) (2.13) (2.14) (1.92) (1.09) (1.00)
Dmat 0.0930*** 0.0912*** 0.0904*** 0.0928*** 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.104*** 0.107*** 0.100*** 0.104*** 0.115*** 0.116***
(6.83) (6.99) (5.71) (6.83) (8.00) (7.99) (8.57) (8.72) (6.67) (8.47) (9.40) (9.50)
lb 0.0206 0.00841 0.00819 0.0168 0.00640 0.00418 0.315*** 0.310*** 0.319*** 0.309*** 0.324*** 0.317***
(0.74) (0.30) (0.27) (0.62) (0.26) (0.17) (7.43) (7.70) (7.32) (7.43) (7.86) (7.51)
constant 0.0824* 0.0889** 0.0990** 0.0858* 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.168*** 0.170*** 0.177*** 0.169*** 0.213*** 0.218***
(2.58) (2.97) (3.28) (2.77) (4.00) (4.01) (7.12) (8.71) (8.92) (7.63) (8.47) (8.74)
country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3066 3066 3066 3066 2479 2479 3066 3066 3066 3066 2479 2479
R-sq 0.910 0.910 0.909 0.909 0.921 0.920 0.863 0.863 0.864 0.864 0.884 0.883
credit =cds credit=u_cds
Notes: The table presents the estimated coefficients and the respective significance levels (*** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%). The t-statistics are
presented in brackets. cds represents the CDS premium; u_cds represents the CDS residuals from auxiliary regressions; pr corresponds to
the risk premium in international financial markets; lb is a dummy for the period after the collapse of Lehman Brothers; mat corresponds to
a maturity variable; Dmat has the value 1 for bonds with 10 year residual maturity; ba, depth, max, adepth, trs and vol correspond to
liquidity indicators based on MTS data. The interaction terms between dummy lb and the other variables are identified by _lb at the end of
the variable name. The variables for each country are defined in differences against Germany.
35Table 6: Results of spreads estimation in the period 2007-2009: credit risk measured by macroeconomic variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
so -0.0475*** -0.0521*** -0.0512*** -0.0372** -0.0552*** -0.0551*** -0.0569*** -0.0591*** -0.0601*** -0.0464** -0.0647*** -0.0645*** -0.0338** -0.0442*** -0.0405** -0.0237* -0.0455** -0.0455**
(-3.36) (-4.38) (-4.03) (-2.84) (-3.88) (-3.92) (-3.91) (-5.04) (-4.75) (-3.25) (-4.41) (-4.49) (-2.37) (-3.57) (-3.05) (-1.95) (-3.18) (-3.20)
div_06 0.00403*** 0.00425*** 0.00480*** 0.00413*** 0.00399** 0.00365** 0.00389** 0.00395** 0.00439** 0.00412** 0.00378** 0.00328** 0.00397** 0.00459** 0.00566*** 0.00388** 0.00423** 0.00397**
(3.02) (3.04) (3.31) (3.17) (2.79) (2.71) (3.10) (3.07) (3.14) (3.27) (2.67) (2.51) (2.87) (3.02) (3.66) (2.95) (2.85) (2.83)
iip_06 -0.00169*** -0.00159*** -0.00156*** -0.00181*** -0.00173*** -0.00166** -0.00175*** -0.00160*** -0.00149*** -0.00195*** -0.00180*** -0.00167*** -0.00136** -0.00158** -0.00161*** -0.00146** -0.00166** -0.00166**
(-3.82) (-3.62) (-4.08) (-3.67) (-3.63) (-3.51) (-4.53) (-4.23) (-4.90) (-4.20) (-4.22) (-3.90) (-3.08) (-3.11) (-3.56) (-2.95) (-3.09) (-3.09)
pr 0.0583*** 0.0710*** 0.0702*** 0.0517** 0.0712*** 0.0736*** 0.0562*** 0.0663*** 0.0684*** 0.0491** 0.0680*** 0.0718*** 0.0464** 0.0761** 0.0716*** 0.0458* 0.0743*** 0.0758***
(3.53) (4.19) (4.51) (3.43) (4.21) (4.16) (3.37) (3.76) (4.08) (3.15) (4.28) (4.21) (2.70) (4.35) (4.57) (3.09) (4.10) (4.09)
share_06 -0.0112** -0.0142** -0.0127** -0.0101** -0.0123*** -0.0133*** -0.0121** -0.0141*** -0.0125** -0.0107** -0.0127** -0.0140*** -0.00889** -0.0143** -0.0130** -0.00873* -0.0118** -0.0127**
(-2.87) (-3.16) (-3.14) (-2.89) (-3.03) (-3.18) (-3.06) (-3.33) (-3.27) (-3.05) (-3.16) (-3.45) (-2.39) (-2.99) (-3.05) (-2.66) (-2.80) (-2.80)
ba 0.239*** 0.150*** 0.690***
(6.30) (5.76) (3.99)
depth -13.30** -17.51 -12.54**
(-2.28) (-2.12) (-2.31)
max -5.048** -5.760** -6.472***
(-2.84) (-2.32) (-3.30)
adepth 0.00605*** 0.00437*** 0.0117***
(10.12) (8.81) (12.12)
vol -0.598 -0.558 -0.868*
(-1.72) (-1.64) (-1.97)
trs 0.00141 0.00169 0.00186
(1.10) (1.41) (0.51)
Dmat 0.0966*** 0.104*** 0.0694** 0.0889*** 0.129*** 0.122***
(4.04) (4.02) (2.63) (3.48) (5.34) (5.48)
lb 0.247*** 0.309*** 0.289*** 0.242*** 0.259*** 0.254*** 0.300*** 0.402*** 0.377*** 0.298*** 0.314*** 0.304** 0.189** 0.236*** 0.212** 0.176*** 0.205** 0.205**
(4.40) (5.63) (5.83) (5.01) (3.73) (3.51) (5.54) (8.06) (9.42) (6.18) (4.82) (4.30) (3.27) (3.32) (2.97) (3.40) (2.63) (2.60)
constant -0.0285 -0.0815 -0.00957 -0.0315 -0.0149 -0.0355 0.0442 -0.0309 0.0211 0.0355 0.0765 0.0489 -0.00782 -0.0459 0.0304 -0.0104 0.0279 -0.00199
(-0.49) (-0.89) (-0.14) (-0.57) (-0.23) (-0.52) (0.80) (-0.33) (0.28) (0.66) (1.42) (0.85) (-0.17) (-0.51) (0.51) (-0.21) (0.42) (-0.03)
N 710 710 710 710 696 696 355 355 355 355 343 343 355 355 355 355 353 353
R-sq 0.665 0.662 0.665 0.707 0.652 0.650 0.675 0.681 0.686 0.709 0.680 0.679 0.680 0.644 0.655 0.738 0.622 0.620
All bonds 10 year residual maturity bonds 5 year residual maturity bonds
Notes: The table presents the estimated coefficients and the respective significance levels (*** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%). The t-statistics are presented in brackets. so corresponds to the fiscal balance forecast; div_06  corresponds 
to the public debt at end 2006; iip_06 corresponds to the international investment position at end 2006; pr represents the monthly average of the risk premium in the international financial markets; share_06 represents the
relative size of the public debt market at end 2006; ba, depth, max, adepth, vol and trs correspond to the monthly average of the liquidity indicators based on MTS data; Dmat has the value 1 for bonds with 10 year residual
maturity; lb is a dummy for the period after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The variables for each country are defined in differences against Germany.
3
6Table 7: Results of spreads estimation in the period 2007-2009: credit risk measured by macroeconomic variables
Regressions with interaction terms with time dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
so -0.00240 -0.00383 -0.00330 -0.00237 -0.00301 -0.00322 -0.00457 -0.00612* -0.00486 -0.00456 -0.00520* -0.00574* 0.000841 -0.000885 0.00317 0.000593 -0.00000402 0.0000245
(-1.17) (-1.71) (-1.38) (-1.20) (-1.42) (-1.56) (-1.64) (-1.91) (-1.51) (-1.73) (-1.87) (-2.16) (0.59) (-0.50) (1.76) (0.39) (-0.00) (0.01)
so_lb -0.0946*** -0.0716*** -0.0815*** -0.0810*** -0.102*** -0.103*** -0.101*** -0.0740*** -0.0842*** -0.0881*** -0.110*** -0.111*** -0.0842*** -0.0664*** -0.0827*** -0.0676** -0.0951*** -0.0956***
(-7.70) (-6.62) (-7.41) (-6.36) (-8.69) (-8.88) (-7.64) (-6.02) (-6.64) (-5.69) (-9.01) (-9.82) (-5.29) (-6.32) (-6.18) (-4.59) (-7.05) (-6.87)
div_06 0.00220*** 0.00217*** 0.00220*** 0.00220*** 0.00226*** 0.00220*** 0.00245*** 0.00237*** 0.00253*** 0.00242*** 0.00246*** 0.00234*** 0.00200*** 0.00207*** 0.00264*** 0.00202*** 0.00210*** 0.00209***
(7.25) (7.41) (5.73) (7.58) (6.69) (6.58) (15.19) (17.13) (14.44) (17.63) (12.29) (11.93) (4.43) (4.80) (6.00) (4.57) (4.60) (4.56)
div06_lb 0.00833*** 0.00751*** 0.00836*** 0.00793*** 0.00868*** 0.00799*** 0.00777*** 0.00671*** 0.00752*** 0.00768*** 0.00835*** 0.00735*** 0.00838*** 0.00808*** 0.00843*** 0.00740*** 0.00918*** 0.00863***
(6.72) (6.18) (6.35) (6.05) (6.26) (5.60) (6.57) (6.89) (6.35) (6.49) (5.27) (4.40) (5.20) (5.23) (5.43) (4.14) (6.59) (6.24)
iip_06 -0.00107*** -0.00105*** -0.00107*** -0.00107*** -0.00110*** -0.00107*** -0.00131*** -0.00125*** -0.00128*** -0.00130*** -0.00131*** -0.00126*** -0.000851*** -0.000853*** -0.000953*** -0.000860*** -0.000878*** -0.000880***
(-7.66) (-7.58) (-7.28) (-7.53) (-7.11) (-7.05) (-10.20) (-10.97) (-10.64) (-9.80) (-9.34) (-9.35) (-5.67) (-5.34) (-6.91) (-5.52) (-5.54) (-5.49)
iip06_lb -0.00161** -0.00170** -0.00100* -0.00176** -0.00170** -0.00170** -0.00134** -0.00151* -0.000429 -0.00162** -0.00146** -0.00147*** -0.00154 -0.00193** -0.00141* -0.00157 -0.00195* -0.00196*
(-2.43) (-2.38) (-1.76) (-2.40) (-2.39) (-2.37) (-2.54) (-2.19) (-0.99) (-2.49) (-2.54) (-2.40) (-1.77) (-2.42) (-1.91) (-1.83) (-2.19) (-2.23)
pr 0.0448*** 0.0523*** 0.0526*** 0.0452*** 0.0517*** 0.0520*** 0.0461*** 0.0562*** 0.0588*** 0.0456*** 0.0552*** 0.0557*** 0.0399*** 0.0486*** 0.0490*** 0.0427*** 0.0481*** 0.0483***
(6.76) (8.53) (8.47) (6.59) (8.94) (8.73) (5.28) (7.15) (7.04) (4.88) (7.34) (7.28) (9.68) (10.17) (11.32) (8.91) (11.72) (11.21)
pr_lb 0.0447 0.0431 0.0307 0.0339 0.0514 0.0589* 0.0348 0.0278 0.00764 0.0248 0.0400 0.0525 0.0472 0.0578** 0.0493* 0.0360 0.0605* 0.0651*
(1.44) (1.48) (1.03) (1.12) (1.72) (1.97) (0.99) (0.79) (0.23) (0.70) (1.31) (1.72) (1.51) (2.29) (1.85) (1.27) (2.02) (2.23)
share_06 -0.00180*** -0.00222*** -0.00209*** -0.00198*** -0.00174*** -0.00196*** -0.00174*** -0.00228** -0.00190*** -0.00187*** -0.00191*** -0.00232*** -0.00170*** -0.00233*** -0.00210*** -0.00200** -0.00154*** -0.00149***
(-4.14) (-4.28) (-4.40) (-4.38) (-4.37) (-4.81) (-4.12) (-4.37) (-3.92) (-4.41) (-4.80) (-5.77) (-3.89) (-4.54) (-4.54) (-4.33) (-3.65) (-3.37)
share_06_lb -0.0236*** -0.0274*** -0.0235*** -0.0211*** -0.0259*** -0.0265*** -0.0244*** -0.0265*** -0.0234*** -0.0218*** -0.0266*** -0.0269*** -0.0210** -0.0281*** -0.0235*** -0.0189** -0.0250*** -0.0262***
(-4.76) (-5.73) (-4.88) (-4.74) (-5.51) (-4.97) (-5.58) (-7.79) (-5.73) (-5.68) (-6.37) (-5.63) (-3.23) (-4.52) (-4.17) (-3.36) (-4.65) (-3.96)
ba 0.235** 0.275** 0.307**
(2.43) (3.05) (2.41)
ba_lb -0.0732 -0.168 0.120
(-0.67) (-1.83) (0.48)
depth -0.815 -1.793 -1.571**
(-1.06) (-1.65) (-2.95)
depth_lb -59.19*** -70.41*** -55.05**
(-3.96) (-4.61) (-3.06)
max -0.206 -0.881* -1.415***
(-0.37) (-2.27) (-4.72)
max_lb -12.55** -14.96*** -9.161**
(-3.85) (-4.13) (-2.67)
adepth 0.00399** 0.00515*** 0.00374*
(2.81) (3.41) (2.19)
adepth_lb 0.000573 -0.00173 0.00489**
(0.38) (-1.10) (2.40)
vol -0.191 -0.0872 -0.430**
(-1.46) (-0.73) (-2.68)
vol_lb -1.371* -1.714** -1.756
(-2.02) (-3.09) (-1.28)
trs -0.000341 0.000398 -0.00210*
(-0.52) (0.64) (-2.25)
trs_lb 0.00473 0.00285 0.00766
(0.89) (0.76) (0.46)
Dmat 0.101*** 0.136*** 0.116*** 0.0949*** 0.131*** 0.123***
(4.37) (4.23) (3.93) (3.81) (5.42) (5.70)
lb -0.232** -0.228** -0.104 -0.210* -0.248** -0.310** -0.166 -0.106 0.0175 -0.145 -0.175* -0.258** -0.260* -0.327** -0.211 -0.244* -0.301* -0.363*
(-2.19) (-2.39) (-1.12) (-2.06) (-2.31) (-2.45) (-1.81) (-1.38) (0.22) (-1.62) (-2.15) (-2.73) (-1.92) (-2.47) (-1.76) (-1.89) (-2.06) (-2.01)
constant 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.119*** 0.107*** 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.182*** 0.203*** 0.210*** 0.178*** 0.214*** 0.207*** 0.119*** 0.134*** 0.146*** 0.124*** 0.155*** 0.152***
(4.83) (4.42) (4.76) (4.62) (6.06) (6.11) (7.08) (9.29) (8.58) (6.53) (10.77) (10.37) (8.67) (7.34) (8.35) (7.78) (9.41) (8.96)
N 710 710 710 710 696 696 355 355 355 355 343 343 355 355 355 355 353 353
R-sq 0.762 0.794 0.775 0.786 0.769 0.767 0.765 0.807 0.791 0.785 0.791 0.787 0.770 0.794 0.770 0.805 0.753 0.750
All bonds 10 year residual maturity bonds 5 year residual maturity bonds
Notes: The table presents the estimated coefficients and the respective significance levels (*** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%). The t-statistics are presented in brackets. so corresponds to the fiscal balance forecast; div_06 corresponds to the public debt
at end 2006; iip_06 corresponds to the international investment position at end 2006; pr represents the monthly average of the risk premium in the international financial markets; share_06 represents the relative size of the public debt market
at end 2006; ba, depth, max, adepth, vol and trs correspond to the monthly average of the liquidity indicators based on MTS data; Dmat has the value 1 for bonds with 10 year residual maturity; lb is a dummy for the period after the collapse
of Lehman Brothers. The interaction terms between dummy lb and the other variables are identified by _lb at the end of the variable name. The variables for each country are defined in differences against Germany.
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Notes: The table presents the estimated coefficients and the
respective significance levels (*** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%).
The t-statistics are presented in brackets. so corresponds to
the fiscal balance forecast; div_06 corresponds to the public
debt at end 2006; iip_06 corresponds to the international
investment position at end 2006; pr represents the monthly
average of the risk premium in the international financial
markets; share_06 represents the relative size of the public
debt market at end 2006; Dmat has the value 1 for bonds
with 10 year residual maturity; lb* is a dummy for the
period between the collapse of Lehman Brothers and
October 2009; nov is a dummy for the period after
November 2009. The interaction terms between the time
dummies and the other variables are identified by _lb* and
_nov at the end of the variable name. The variables for
each country are defined in differences against Germany.
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